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I. INTRODUCTION 
ERISA1 is a federal statute that regulates employee benefits such as pensions, 
401(k) plans, health care, and disability—collectively some of the most important 
property and contract rights that working Americans have. Passed in 1974,2 
ERISA preempts state law3 and imposes fiduciary duties on those who administer 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). This Article 
generally cites to ERISA but provides parallel citations to the United States Code. 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.  
3. ERISA generally preempts any state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. ERISA § 
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employee benefits.4 ERISA fiduciary duties largely track the duties of a trustee. So, 
ERISA requires employers to set aside funds in trust to pay pension benefits 
(including those offered under 401(k) plans). Employers need not, however, set 
aside funds to pay non-pension benefits (called welfare benefits), but may do so if 
they wish or to satisfy the demands of a labor union. The legal entity that pays 
ERISA-covered benefits is the “plan,” and any associated funds are “plan assets.” 
An ERISA fiduciary who harms or abuses plan assets (e.g., by negligent 
investing) must make the plan whole by paying either damages or restitution.5 
Trust beneficiaries may seek similar redress for breach of trust. Yet, unlike trust 
law, ERISA imposes fiduciary duties extending beyond the management and 
distribution of property. ERISA fiduciaries have discretion to pay or deny claims 
for benefits, and a wrongful denial of benefits can devastate an employee and her 
covered dependents. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc.,6 Florence Corcoran was 
suffering through a difficult pregnancy and asked her ERISA-covered health plan 
to pay for hospitalization, which her doctor had recommended. The reviewing 
fiduciary (United Healthcare) denied the claim, determining hospitalization to be 
medically unnecessary despite her doctor’s recommendation. About two weeks 
later, Mrs. Corcoran’s fetus went into distress and died.7 Mrs. Corcoran sued 
United Healthcare, but the Fifth Circuit—in interpreting Supreme Court precedent 
at the time—denied her any ERISA remedy.8 
Later Supreme Court cases confirm the result of Corcoran.9 Fiduciary 
breaches that harm plan assets warrant full relief. Breaches that do not harm plan 
assets warrant only “appropriate equitable relief,” which excludes most forms of 
monetary relief according to the Court.10 Most commentators, the Department of 
Labor, and several judges and justices would grant money damages to plaintiffs 
like Mrs. Corcoran.11 These reformers note that Congress based ERISA on trust 
law and argue that the Court should conform ERISA remedies with trust remedies, 
which aim to “make whole” beneficiaries who are harmed by fiduciary breach.12 
 
514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). ERISA allows states to regulate insurance companies even if they 
insure ERISA-governed benefits. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
4. Id. § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
5. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
6. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the 
Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 155 (2009) (“As far as wrongful denial of benefits claim 
scenarios, few are better known than [Corcoran].”). 
7. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.  
8. Id. at 1328, 1332–34. 
9. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of cases confirming the result of Corcoran.  
10. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255–58 (1993) (noting that equitable relief 
traditionally precludes monetary damages); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151 n.3 (1985) 
(noting statute does not provide for extracontractual damages).  
11. Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” 
Relief Is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 723–25 (2008); see also Colleen E. 
Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 827, 848–50 (2006).  
12. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. 07-841 
(U.S. May 23, 2008), 2008 WL 2185730 (arguing that breaching ERISA fiduciaries should be treated 
analogously to breaching trust fiduciaries).  
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But this make-whole argument ignores the central role of property in trust 
law. The Restatement and treatises all define a trust as “a fiduciary relationship 
with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property 
is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another 
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.”13 
Trustees breach this “fiduciary relationship with respect to property” when they 
harm or misappropriate trust property, and the make-whole principle redresses 
such property-based breaches. Trust law does not routinely redress harm that is 
personal to the beneficiary with damages.14 
Health and other welfare plans often hold no assets and comprise promises 
to pay benefits. They impose “merely personal duties” upon the employer (or 
other administrator of the plan), precluding the application of trust law.15 
Nevertheless, the courts roughly follow the remedial system of trust in ERISA 
cases, redressing breaches that involve plan assets but denying relief to 
employees for their personal harm. Trust law, rather than being the solution to 
ERISA remedies, is part of the problem. 
The other part of the problem is the Supreme Court’s inconsistency in 
interpreting ERISA. The Supreme Court has consistently narrowed ERISA 
remedies, but has used inconsistent methods of statutory interpretation to do so. 
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell,16 the Court found that section 
409(a) does not redress a fiduciary breach causing personal harm.17 Even though 
the text of section 409(a) would support granting “equitable or remedial relief” for 
any breach, the Court found that the overall purpose and context of the statute 
protected only plan assets and the plan itself.18 Yet, in Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates19 and Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,20 the Court 
analyzed section 502(a)(3) textually, concluding that its narrower grant of 
“equitable relief” must mean something less than all relief.21 Based on historical 
equity practice, the Court held that section 502(a)(3) does not offer the remedies 
of damages or even legal (as opposed to equitable) restitution. 
Those who would reform ERISA remedies focus their attention on Mertens, 
Great-West, and the need to incorporate the “make-whole doctrine” of trust law 
 
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); accord 1 AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT 
& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (3d ed. 2007), available at Westlaw 
BOGERT [hereinafter BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES]. But cf. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of 
the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 671 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis] (arguing that 
trust law operates more like contract than property law). 
14. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of how make-whole relief redresses property-based 
breaches in trust law. 
15. See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of a trust and 
how it requires more than the imposition of merely personal duties.  
16. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).  
17. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144. 
18. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the Russell Court’s analysis.  
19. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
20. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).  
21. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of Mertens and Great-West and the Court’s narrow 
reading of “equitable relief” therein. 
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into section 502(a)(3).22 The make-whole theorists, though, overlook the limits of 
trust remedies and the textual barriers to interpreting the “equitable relief” of 
section 502(a)(3) broadly. The superior way of expanding ERISA remedies is 
through the broader grant of “equitable or remedial relief” under section 409(a). 
Unlike section 502(a)(3), section 409(a) is directed expressly at fiduciary 
breaches and avoids the trap of historical equity practice. By broadening section 
409(a), the Supreme Court would point ERISA’s remedies away from the law of 
trusts and towards the text of the statute.  
II. ERISA FIDUCIARY STANDARDS 
A. The ERISA Fiduciary Relationship  
To be a fiduciary is to be in a relationship with another. A trust, for example, 
is “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property” joining trustee and 
beneficiary and arising from the intent of the settlor.23 The trustee holds a formal 
office subject to onerous duties and heavy sanctions for breach. Reflecting the 
burdens of the office, trust law requires consent by the trustee.24 
ERISA creates a fiduciary relationship with respect to any “employee benefit 
plan” or simply “plan,” which provides either “pension” or “welfare” benefits.25 
Pension plans—including 401(k) plans—provide retirement income26 to 
employees and must be funded by the employer.27 Because it is funded, a pension 
plan is a “fiduciary relationship with respect to property”—just like a trust.  
Welfare plans provide health care, disability benefits, severance, and life 
insurance to employees.28 Administering welfare plans (e.g., reviewing employees’ 
claims for benefits) is a fiduciary function.29 While welfare plans may be “fiduciary 
relationships,” the relationship is often not one “with respect to property” because 
benefits are paid directly from the employer’s general assets rather than a 
 
22. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error 
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, Trail of 
Error].  
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the Restatement (Second) of Trusts’ definition of 
a trust.  
24. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 150 (“The cases fully sustain the position 
that a person named as trustee in a deed or will always has the election of accepting the trust or 
rejecting it and statutes often give the power to disclaim or decline the trusteeship. No one can be 
compelled to undertake the burdens of trusteeship against his desire.” (footnotes omitted)). 
25. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
26. Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).  
27. Pension plans come in two categories: defined contribution and defined benefit. Defined 
contribution plans are “based solely upon the amount contributed to the [employee’s] account,” along 
with any associated income, expenses, gains, and losses. Id. §§ 3(34)–(35), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)–(35); 
see also id. § 3(23)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (defining accrued benefit of DC plan as “the balance of the 
individual’s account”). Defined plans must pay benefits “in the form of an annual benefit commencing at 
normal retirement age.” Id. § 3(23)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A). ERISA requires employers to fund 
defined-benefit plans. See Id. §§ 301–07, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–85.  
28. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
29. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218–19 (2004). 
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segregated trust fund.30 Nevertheless, ERISA treats all ERISA plans, whether or 
not funded, as trusts and impose fiduciary duties on those who administer them.31 
ERISA provides for formal fiduciary offices—including that of trustee—but 
extends its fiduciary reach broadly.32 The possession or exercise of discretionary 
authority or control over a plan is sufficient to make one a “fiduciary with respect 
to a plan.”33 Formal consent is not necessary for ERISA fiduciary status, which 
triggers the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence. 
B. Duty of Loyalty (a.k.a. the Exclusive Benefit Rule) 
ERISA was enacted primarily to reform defined-benefit pension plans, 
although it covers all employee benefit plans.34 Prior to ERISA’s passage, legions of 
disappointed workers would write government officials to complain that they 
were denied pension benefits for failing to meet decades-long vesting schedules.35 
A plan might have required twenty years of service with an employer before 
vesting, and an employee who left after nineteen years would leave without any 
pension at all. Workers who had vested in their pension benefits could still lose 
out if their pension plan failed and terminated without enough assets to pay 
everyone.36 
ERISA responded to these scandals by mandating vesting according to a fixed 
schedule,37 mandating minimum funding of ongoing plans,38 and partially insuring 
benefit payments from failed plans.39 ERISA also created an administrative 
framework that completely federalized the rights and remedies with respect to 
benefit plans.40 Most importantly for this Article, ERISA imposed mandatory 
 
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the 
definition of a trust. 
31. See Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary 
Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 395 (2000) (explaining that ERISA treats any individual with discretion 
over assets, administration, or management of benefit plan—or is paid to give investment advice to 
benefit plan—as a fiduciary). 
32. Id.  
33. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
34. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL 
HISTORY 4–5 (2004) (describing pre-ERISA pension plan environment and need for pension plan 
reform). 
35. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. Sen. Special Comm. on Aging, 
98th Cong., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade 16 (1984), 
substantially reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 67–78 (4th ed. 2006) 
(finding that numerous personal letters sent to government offices confirmed that workers were denied 
pension benefits despite many years on the job). 
36. See generally James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) (describing 
infamous Studebaker plant shutdown in Indiana, where pension plan lacked sufficient assets to meet all 
obligations). 
37. ERISA §§ 201–08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051–58.  
38. Id. §§ 301–05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–85. 
39. Id. §§ 4000–4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1461.  
40. See id. §§ 501–14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131–44 (creating criminal and civil penalties and establishing 
claims procedures, investigatory rights, and other administrative guidelines for enforcement of ERISA).  
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fiduciary duties on all who held discretion over plans.41 ERISA did not invent the 
idea of holding benefit-plan assets in trust, a practice employers performed 
voluntarily in the late-nineteenth century and codified in federal tax and labor 
laws in the early to mid-twentieth century.42 Nevertheless, it federalized and 
mandated a trust model for all employee benefit plans. 
The duty of loyalty is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee,”43 
and preeminent in the trust-law duty of loyalty is the prohibition against self-
dealing.44 The fiduciary provisions were prompted in part by the looting of 
pension funds, particularly by union officials, which eroded funds that had been 
set aside for the payment of benefits.45 Pre-ERISA law was not inert in combating 
pension looters, who were already subject to federal criminal sanction. Jimmy 
Hoffa, famously, was convicted and jailed in 1964 for defrauding the Central States 
Teamsters’ pension plan.46 Nevertheless, Congress viewed these controls as 
inadequate and imposed heightened fiduciary standards in ERISA. 
Even though pension plans were the focus of ERISA, the fiduciary provisions 
apply to almost all varieties of plans.47 Would-be Jimmy Hoffas can loot welfare 
funds just as well as pension funds.48 What is curious about the fiduciary 
standards, though, is that they reach the entire administration of plans, rather 
than just the management and distribution of plan assets.49 For example, 
employers typically provide health care and disability benefits by paying the costs 
directly or by buying insurance for employees. Despite the historical concern of 
misusing plan assets, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA make no exception for 
unfunded plans.50 
While the loyalty standard makes sense for pension plans, it is virtually 
incoherent when applied to unfunded ERISA plans. The cardinal element of the 
duty of loyalty is the prohibition on self-dealing. One might plausibly claim that 
unfunded plans never involve self-dealing because there are no assets involved. 
Or, one might just as plausibly claim that unfunded plans universally implicate 
self-dealing because the employer pays the bills directly.51 The reason for this 
 
41. See id. §§ 401–14 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–14 (establishing fiduciary duties and specific protective 
limits, prohibitions, and obligations regarding management and administration of benefit plans).  
42. John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 209. 
43. BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 543.  
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (2007) (prohibiting trustee self-dealing).  
45. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 10–11 (discussing Senate subcommittee’s reaction to 
manipulation of pension funds by two New Jersey unions).  
46. WOOTEN, supra note 34, at 118.  
47. See ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (outlining types of plans governed by ERISA).  
48. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 119–20 (explaining that general prevention of self-dealing 
and mismanagement in multiemployer plans requires subjecting welfare benefit plans to same fiduciary 
requirements as pension plans.)  
49. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506–07 (1996) (holding that employer, who was also 
plan administer, breached fiduciary duty when deliberately misled employees to change benefit plans).  
50. See Muir, supra note 31, at 401–04 (suggesting that unfunded plans were not exempted from 
ERISA because unfunded and underfunded plans were widespread problems necessitating ERISA’s 
enactment). 
51. See generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988).  
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incoherence is that, traditionally, fiduciaries are proxies for beneficiaries. A 
trustee manages assets on behalf of beneficiaries, and an agent takes action on 
behalf of a principal. Beneficiaries or principals need their fiduciary’s expertise, 
which can be effectively deployed only by an expansive grant of authority. The 
potential for abuse of this authority, however, necessitates the imposition of 
fiduciary duties.52 In economic terms, trust law curtails the agency costs inherent 
in discretionary power.53 
Yet, employees seeking medical coverage, disability benefits, or severance 
are not typically seeking expertise from their employer or any other ERISA 
“fiduciary.” An employee’s own physician provides expertise on treatment 
decisions. Employees simply want money to pay the bills. The employer might 
indeed appoint administrators with expertise to handle claims. Fiduciary law is 
probably flexible enough to handle ERISA, so long as judges are aware of the 
inherent limits of existing doctrine. The history of fiduciary law has seen the  
creation of new fiduciary relationships based on analogy. So, for example, the law 
came to impose fiduciary duties on corporate directors by analogizing 
corporations to prototypes like trusts, agency, or partnerships.54 
Nevertheless, analogy to prototypes is useful only at the initial stage of 
doctrinal development. Even if corporate directors were initially recognized as 
fiduciaries, it did not follow that trust law held all (or even many) answers to 
corporate law issues. Perhaps employers should themselves be viewed as lawful 
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans along with their employee. Under this 
view, employers would be restrained by the duty of impartiality, under which they 
may not favor their own beneficial interest over that of their employees.55 
C. Duty of Prudence 
ERISA also imports the duty of prudence from trust law, imposing on its 
fiduciaries the obligation to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims.”56 The classic application of prudence principles is to 
 
52. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 804 (1983) (discussing potential for 
abuse arising from delegation of power to fiduciary). 
53. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624–26 
(2004) (arguing trust law should minimize agency costs inherent in granting trustee discretionary 
authority).  
54. See Frankel, supra note 52, at 804–05 (explaining that courts create new fiduciary 
relationships by drawing analogies to prototypical fiduciary relationships such as agency, trust, and 
bailment). But cf. Sitkoff, supra note 53, at 623 & n.2 (noting historical connection between trust and 
corporation).  
55. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 51, at 1159–60 (suggesting duty of impartiality should be 
imported to pension law).  
56. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006). A traditional trustee is required to 
“exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has 
greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).  
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trust investing. ERISA fiduciaries who handle assets must also diversify plan 
investments, except for those rare occasions in which doing so is imprudent and 
those common occasions when the plan invests in employer securities.57 The 
traditional trust-law standard is adequate for policing investments of plan assets. 
We simply ask if a reasonable person would invest this way with his or her own 
money. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted claims decisions as being fiduciary acts.58 
In a traditional trust, distribution decisions are regulated by the duty of prudence 
and also the duty of impartiality.59 The trustee must balance the interest of 
various claimants in the assets she administers. But, the administrator of an 
unfunded ERISA plan is not balancing various claims to assets. She is simply 
deciding whether to perform on a contract. Again, the employee does not want 
fiduciary expertise from the administrator, only the payment of benefits. 
Traditional trust law, then, is an imperfect fit for regulating unfunded ERISA 
plans. As the Supreme Court recently said, trust-law principles “serve as a guide 
under ERISA but do not ‘tell the entire story.’”60 Professor Dana Muir has 
contrasted “asset administration” (e.g., investing assets) and “benefit 
administration” (e.g., handling claims).61 When Congress enacted the fiduciary 
provisions of ERISA, it was focused on pension plans and asset administration and 
looked to trust law as a regulatory model.62 Benefit administration is less 
important to pension plans because of the dramatically lower level of discretion. 
For example, benefits under a defined-benefit pension plan must be “definitely 
determinable,”63 thus precluding broad administrative discretion.64 But benefit 
administration is hugely important to welfare plans. One court has even held that 
payment of welfare benefits can be within the complete discretion of the 
employer.65 In the area of benefit administration, the trust model of ERISA is at its 
weakest. Not coincidentally, this is the area where ERISA remedies are at their 
narrowest. 
 
57. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); id. § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). 
58. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 218–19 (2004). 
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 232. 
60. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1643 (2010) (quoting Variety Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 
489, 497 (1996)). 
61. Muir, supra note 31, at 399–410 (quoting Varity, 516 U.S. at 497).  
62. See id. at 399–404 (discussing Congress’s focus on pension plans and problems with asset 
administration, which led to ERISA’s enactment).  
63. 26 C.F.R § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009). 
64. This is not to say that courts deny administrative discretion over pension plans. See, e.g., 
Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1651 (granting discretion to administrator of defined-benefit plan after 
administrator initially miscalculated benefits).  
65. See Hamilton v. Air Jam., Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA does not 
forbid employer from making individual benefit determinations on case-by-case basis). 
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III. ERISA REMEDIES 
A. Statutory System 
By statute, ERISA preempts state law that “relate[s] to” any employee benefit 
plan,66 preempting almost any state law claim based on the misconduct of an 
ERISA fiduciary. For example, even though ERISA saves state insurance regulation 
from preemption,67 the Supreme Court has held that this exception does not allow 
employees to seek remedies under state insurance law.68 According to the Court, 
ERISA’s remedial provisions have their own preemptive force, making them the 
exclusive means by which beneficiaries can seek redress for fiduciary breach. Just 
as ERISA’s statutory remedies preempt state law remedies (even those based on 
state insurance law), it also precludes implicit federal remedies.69 If an aggrieved 
employee cannot bring a claim under one of ERISA’s express statutory provisions, 
she has no remedy at all. 
ERISA has three major remedies for employees, found in the first three parts 
of section 502(a), which read as follows: 
A civil action may be brought— 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary— 
. . . . 
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary for appropriate relief under [section 409 of ERISA]; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act 
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan.70 
The “appropriate relief” of section 409 is as follows: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by 
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such 
 
66. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
67. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
68. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that Texas Health Care 
Liability Act claims are completely preempted by ERISA); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 
(1987) (finding state lawsuit asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under ERISA-regulated 
plan preempted by federal law).  
69. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that ERISA even 
precludes extracontractual damages that arise from improper or untimely processing of claims).  
70. ERISA § 502(a)(1)–(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)–(3). 
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other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary.71  
The three remedies just described are the workhorses of ERISA litigation, 
although ERISA does grant less important remedies to enforce statutory penalties 
and the like.72 Together, they make up what the Supreme Court described as a 
“carefully integrated . . . . interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial 
scheme, which is . . . part of a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute.’”73  
According to Professor Dobbs, “[j]udicial remedies usually fall in one of four 
major categories: (1) Damages remedies, (2) Restitutionary remedies, (3) 
Coercive remedies . . . or (4) Declaratory remedies.”74 ERISA clearly grants 
declaratory and coercive remedies, as an employee can bring an action “to clarify 
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan” and the court can “enjoin 
any act or practice which violates [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.”75 The 
provisions also grant the ability to enforce the payment of promised benefits.76  
The Supreme Court has struggled, though, in determining what other forms 
of damages and restitution ERISA offers.77 The aim of the damages remedy is to 
make whole a plaintiff for harm suffered, and the aim of restitution is to prevent 
unjust enrichment of a defendant by restoring her wrongful gains to the plaintiff.78 
As we will see in the remainder of this Part, ERISA grants full damages and 
restitution to redress a fiduciary breach involving plan assets. Fiduciary breaches 
that do not involve plan assets, along with other ERISA violations, warrant far 
narrower remedies—in essence, equitable restitution but no damages or legal 
restitution. 
B. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell  
As previously noted, ERISA section 409(a) imposes personal liability on 
fiduciaries that breach their fiduciary duties.79 Conceptually, section 409(a) offers 
four classes of remedies: (1) reimbursement of losses to plan assets; (2) payment 
of profits made by the fiduciary’s use of plan assets; (3) removal of a breaching 
fiduciary; and (4) “other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate.”80 
 
71. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
72. See id. § 502(a)(4)–(10), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4)–(10) (listing further remedial options available 
to Secretary of Labor).  
73. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 
361 (1980)).  
74. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §1.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1993).  
75. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); id. § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).  
76. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); id. § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).  
77. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions determining forms of damages and restitution 
available under ERISA, see infra the remainder of Part III.  
78. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 3.1.  
79. See infra note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies for breach of fiduciary 
duties.  
80. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).  
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The first three remedies largely track the liability that the law of trusts 
imposes to redress a breach of trust. Trustees are subject to personal liability for 
any harm they cause to, or any illicit benefit they derive from, trust property.81 
The third category, fiduciary removal, also has a clear corollary in trust law.82 
The fourth category operates as something of catchall for breaching 
fiduciaries. It has no obvious analogue in the Restatement of Trusts beyond the 
fact that trust remedies are exclusively equitable.83 The fourth category is also 
most famous for being the subject of the Supreme Court’s most important ERISA 
decision. 
In Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Co. v. Russell,84 an employee, Doris Russell, 
began receiving benefits under her employer’s ERISA-governed disability plan in 
May 1979. In October 1979, the employer concluded that Doris was not disabled 
and stopped paying benefits.85 Using the employer’s internal appeals process, 
Doris convinced her employer that she was in fact disabled and began receiving 
benefits (including retroactive benefits) in March 1980.86 Doris claimed that the 
interruption of benefit payments harmed her, however, by forcing her husband to 
cash out his own retirement plans, thereby aggravating the psychological 
condition that caused her to become disabled in the first place.87  
Doris then sued her employer, claiming it breached its fiduciary duties by 
mishandling her disability claim and seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
under section 409(a).88 The Supreme Court denied Doris’ claim, construing the 
entirety of section 409(a) as providing only plan-level relief.89 
Russell is most remembered for stating that ERISA has no implied causes of 
action. According to the Court: 
 The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in 
§502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that 
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent 
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of 
ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, 
which is in turn part of a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.”90  
Despite the Court’s triumphal language, most commentators are dubious of the 
draftsmanship that the Court found in ERISA.91 Of the six enforcement provisions, 
 
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (holding trustees personally liable for 
breaches of trust).  
82. See id. § 199 (allowing for removal of trustee for breaches of trust). 
83. See infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclusively equitable 
nature of trust remedies.  
84. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).  
85. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.  
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 137. 
88. Id. at 137–39. 
89. Id. at 140–42, 148.  
90. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).  
91. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims 
Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 613 (1994) (discussing “serious threat” to Congress’s apparent purpose of 
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only three92 offer any significant relief to employees and their beneficiaries, but 
the types of actions that can arise under ERISA are legion.93 Of these remedial 
provisions, Doris brought her claim under only one, ERISA section 409(a);94 she 
did not alternatively ask for relief elsewhere (e.g., under section 502(a)(3)). 
When suing her employer under section 409(a), Doris was making a fairly 
straightforward textual claim. Her employer was a fiduciary who breached its 
duties and should be subject to “equitable or remedial relief as the court may 
deem appropriate.”95 In short, Doris argued that section 409(a) should be 
interpreted so that the black-lined text, appearing below, has no limiting effect on 
her claim: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by 
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary.96  
In other words, Doris viewed section 409(a) as granting alternate and 
independent grounds of relief. It could provide the traditional remedies from trust 
law of redressing harming to plan assets and fiduciary removal.97 In addition and 
more broadly, it could authorize additional “equitable or remedial relief” for 
fiduciary breaches that have no connection to plan assets or the plan as a whole. 
The Court, however, rejected this reading of section 409(a), holding that all 
relief under section 409(a) must flow to the plan and not to individual 
beneficiaries.98 After citing the voluminous legislative history focusing on 
protecting plan assets,99 the Court rejected Doris’ reading of the statute: 
This “blue pencil” method of statutory interpretation—omitting all 
words not part of the clauses deemed pertinent to the task at hand—
impermissibly ignores the relevant context in which statutory language 
subsists. In this case, this mode of interpretation would render 
superfluous the preceding clauses providing relief singularly to the plan, 
and would slight the language following after the phrase “such other 
equitable or remedial relief.” Congress specified that this remedial 
phrase includes “removal of such fiduciary”—an example of the kind of 
“plan-related” relief provided by the more specific clauses it succeeds. A 
 
providing “the full range of legal and equitable remedies” under ERISA).  
92. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three major remedies 
available to employees under ERISA. 
93. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 11, at 831 (indicating “variety of possible claims” under ERISA 
Section 502(a)(3) makes judicial determination of remedies difficult). 
94. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5.  
95. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).  
96. Id. 
97. See infra note 266 and accompanying text for the Restatement (Second) of Trusts list of 
remedies for breach of trust.  
98. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. 
99. Id. at 140 n.8.  
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fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its 
draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan 
assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than 
with the rights of an individual beneficiary.100  
Later, this Article will try to revive Doris’s “blue pencil” method for reading 
section 409(a).101 The important point for now, though, is that Doris was the only 
person harmed by the breach, and her alleged harm was by the untimely payment 
of benefits.102 The Court even suggested that timely payment of plan benefits is 
governed not by the fiduciary provisions of ERISA but by the administrative 
provisions found in section 503.103  
Russell is based on the supposed premise that “there is a stark absence—in 
[ERISA] itself and in its legislative history—of any reference to an intention to 
authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages,”104 which is the Court’s 
curious term for consequential damages. Above, we already saw that ERISA’s 
legislative history shows that Congress was primarily concerned about the misuse 
of plan assets.105 Preventing the Jimmy Hoffas of the world from looting pension 
funds was clearly on the mind of Congress when it enacted the fiduciary 
provisions of ERISA.  
Keeping with this history, the Court said in Russell that ERISA fiduciary duties 
focus on “proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the 
maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.”106 The specific fiduciary duties mentioned in 
Russell are the main duties of a traditional trustee, leading Russell implicitly to 
follow the trust model of basing remedies on harm to property.107  
Yet, Doris’ claim in Russell was about the hardship she alleged from the 
breach of a benefit promise. She had no claim to property, and thus Russell left her 
with no remedy beyond specific performance of the benefit promise. 
The Russell decision could be read to extend beyond section 409(a) so as to 
restrict the entire universe of ERISA remedies. If so, the only remedy an aggrieved 
beneficiary could seek is specific performance of benefit promises. Four Justices 
were sufficiently disturbed by this suggestion as to write a concurring—yet 
critical—opinion of the majority.108 In their view, section 502(a)(3)—which was 
not pled in Russell—could serve as the basis for granting a remedy for the 
mishandling of benefit claims.109 Later cases would both vindicate and frustrate 
the position of the concurring justices. In Varity Corp. v. Howe,110 the Court would 
 
100. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).  
101. See infra Part V for a discussion of how the language in section 409(a) can be interpreted to 
allow for the redress of all fiduciary breaches.  
102. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136–37. 
103. Id. at 143–44.  
104. Id. at 148. 
105. Id. at 142.  
106. Id. at 142–43. 
107. See infra part IV.D.3 for a discussion of the model of basing remedies on harm to property. 
108. Russell, 473 U.S. at 150–51 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
109. Id. at 151–55.  
110. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).  
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in fact hold that breaching fiduciaries could be liable to individual beneficiaries 
under section 502(a)(3).111 Yet, as discussed later, section 502(a)(3) has been 
construed to preclude consequential damages.112 As a result, a remedy does exist 
for individual-level harms, but it is limited to coercive relief and equitable 
restitution.  
Russell expressly sanctioned fiduciary liability for negligently investing 
defined-benefit plan assets.113 Yet, until very recently, it was thought that 
fiduciaries would not be liable for negligently investing the account of a single 
participant in a defined-contribution plan.114 The reason for this theory was dicta 
in Russell: that a fiduciary breach must harm the plan as a whole, not a single 
participant, before the fiduciary could be subject to damages.115 In LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates,116 the Supreme Court held otherwise, subjecting a 
plan fiduciary to liability for negligently investing the account of a single 
participant.  
C. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates  
The plaintiffs in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates117 were employees who 
participated in a pension plan that terminated without enough assets to pay all 
benefits due.118 They sued the fiduciaries of the plan, claiming that the failure to 
fund the plan adequately was a breach of fiduciary duties.119 The deep pockets, 
though, belonged to the plan’s actuary, Hewitt Associates, a multi-billion dollar 
consultancy firm. 
As the plan's actuary, Hewitt was not an ERISA fiduciary.120 The plaintiffs, 
though, claimed that Hewitt was liable for participating in a fiduciary breach by 
not advising the plan sponsor to fund the plan at a higher level.121 Trust law 
imposes liability on non-trustees who participate in a fiduciary breach,122 
although there were good reasons to think that ERISA would not impose a similar 
liability because of the more expansive definition of fiduciaries and the vigorous 
regulation of transactions with nonfiduciary parties in interest.123 Moreover, it is 
 
111. Howe, 516 U.S. at 515. 
112. See infra Parts III.C and III.D for a discussion of cases where the courts have interpreted 
section 502(a)(3) to preclude consequential damages.  
113. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 (finding that section 409 relief must inure to the plan as a whole). 
114. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 11, at 848–52 (discussing difficulties individuals face in obtaining 
remedies for fiduciary duty breach under current Supreme Court interpretations of ERISA).  
115. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140.  
116. 552 U.S. 248 (2008).  
117. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).  
118. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250. 
119. Id. 
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (2009) (advising that actuaries will not ordinarily be considered 
fiduciaries while performing usual professional functions). 
121. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250–51.  
122. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 901.  
123. Unlike trust law, ERISA does not limit fiduciary duties to the formal office of trustee. Instead, 
duties apply to all those with discretion over plan administration. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.                     
§ 1002(21)(A) (2006). Moreover, ERISA has a detailed system of “prohibited transactions” between 
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doubtful that the act of funding a plan even falls within the purview of ERISA 
fiduciary duties at all. Acts such as “establishing, funding, amending, and 
terminating” are considered settlor functions and beyond the bounds of ERISA 
fiduciary duties.124 In short, there likely was no breach for Hewitt to have 
participated in. 
The parties in Mertens, however, focused their efforts on ERISA remedies 
rather than substantive duties. Because Hewitt was not a fiduciary, section 409(a) 
was not available to the plaintiffs; the only remedy available by statute was for 
“appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3).125 The Mertens plaintiffs 
sought money damages to bring the plan up to full funding, and Hewitt argued 
that damages were legal, not equitable, in nature.126 Hewitt won the case because 
the Court found that money damages were legal, not equitable, relief.127 
The Mertens plaintiffs had a fairly straightforward argument, although less 
textual than the plaintiff’s argument in Russell. According to the Mertens plaintiffs, 
“ERISA’s roots [are] in the common law of trusts,”128 and the Restatement on 
Trusts flatly declares that almost all trust remedies are “exclusively equitable.”129 
Historically, trusts were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity courts. 
These courts had broad authority to fashion remedies and could grant monetary 
relief against breaching trustees and third parties who knowingly participated in 
breaches.130 
This exclusivity, though, was not enough to convince Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, that the relief sought was in fact equitable. Quoting Pomeroy’s 
venerable treatise on equity, Justice Scalia said, 
 At common law, however, there were many situations—not limited to 
those involving enforcement of a trust—in which an equity court could 
“establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies which would 
otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.” The term “equitable 
relief” can assuredly mean, as petitioners and the Solicitor General 
would have it, whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide 
in the particular case at issue. But as indicated by the foregoing 
quotation—which speaks of “legal remedies” granted by an equity 
court—“equitable relief” can also refer to those categories of relief that 
were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and 
restitution, but not compensatory damages). As memories of the divided 
bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into 
 
“par[ties] in interest” and the plan. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106. One might reasonably conclude that the 
greater breadth of fiduciary duties would displace the need to impose liability on non-fiduciaries for 
participating in a breach of trust. In a later case, the Court did, however, impose liability for equitable 
restitution upon a nonfiduciary who knowingly participated in a breach. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
Salomon Bros., 530 U.S. 238, 247–48, 253 (2000).  
124. Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  
125. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252–53. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text for a review of the 
remedies available under ERISSA.  
126. Id. at 255–56.  
127. Id. at 257–58.  
128. Id. at 255.  
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).  
130. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. 
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the past, the former meaning becomes, perhaps, increasingly unlikely; 
but it remains a question of interpretation in each case which meaning is 
intended.131  
Justice Scalia’s enumeration of historical equitable relief (i.e., “injunction, 
mandamus, and restitution”) is both unhelpful and wrong.132 Injunction is plainly 
equitable, but it is specifically authorized by ERISA itself.133 Perhaps the Court 
invoked injunction in order to legitimize its exhumation of equity, but as an 
example it illuminates nothing. Mandamus might seem equitable as it is coercive, 
but it was an extraordinary legal remedy like quo warranto, prohibition, and 
habeas corpus.134 At any rate, mandamus is directed at government officials and 
the like,135 giving it little or no application to the typical ERISA case. Finally, as 
discussed later, restitution is a modern invention, fusing legal and equitable 
remedies. Restitution has a very significant equitable heritage but it was not a 
remedy known to historical chancery.136 
Justice Scalia’s real bungle in Mertens, though, was his assertion that courts in 
equity granted legal relief in trust matters.137 The quote from Pomeroy, noting the 
power to “establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies which would 
otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority,” had nothing to do with trust 
law.138  
In the days of the divided bench, an equity court might assume jurisdiction 
over cases in which equity and law courts held “concurrent jurisdiction.” A 
contract claim[ant] enforces a legal right but could seek both equitable relief (e.g., 
specific performance) and legal relief (e.g., damages).139 The equity court could 
assert its (concurrent) jurisdiction over the claim if the “legal remedy [was] not, 
under the circumstances, full, adequate, and complete.”140 And, “if the plaintiff 
sought an injunction or specific performance, and was also entitled to damages, 
the chancellor who granted equitable relief had jurisdiction to go on and grant 
 
131. Id. at 256–57 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 181, 
at 257 (5th ed. 1941)).  
132. See Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1319–21 (criticizing majority’s opinion in 
Mertens). 
133. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
134. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 179–80 (2008).  
135. “[M]andamus operates much in the nature of a bill in chancery for specific performance, the 
principal difference being that the latter remedy is resorted to for the redress of purely private wrongs, 
or the enforcement of contract rights, while the former generally has for its object the performance of 
obligations arising out of official station, or specially imposed by law upon the respondent.” JAMES L. 
HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, AND PROHIBITION 
§ 1, at 4 (1874).  
136. Nevertheless, interpreting section 502(a)(3) as authorizing all forms of restitution is a good 
textual approach to the statute, for reasons discussed below. See infra Part III.D. 
137. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993).  
138. Id. at 256 (quoting 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 181, at 257) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
139. Id. at 256–57.  
140. 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 173, at 234.  
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damages as well, as a matter of economy of litigation.”141 This power is often 
called the “clean-up” doctrine today.142  
Trust law did not, however, belong to the concurrent jurisdiction and is not 
subject to the clean-up doctrine. It belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity 
precisely because trusts were not enforceable at law. They created “purely 
equitable estates and interests.”143 Indeed, because the trust beneficiary’s estate is 
purely equitable, “the question never is asked, nor could be asked, whether the 
remedies given him by a court of law are or are not adequate, since all legal 
remedies are to him impossible.”144 In short, the legal powers described by Justice 
Scalia exist only in the concurrent jurisdiction of equity. Trust remedies, in 
contrast, exist only in the exclusive jurisdiction. 
Despite mangling the ancient law he tried to resurrect, Justice Scalia had a 
valid reason for limiting section 502(a)(3). As a textual matter, section 502(a)(3) 
offers remedies more limited than those under section 409(a). While section 
502(a)(3) offers “equitable relief,” section 409(a) offers “equitable or remedial 
relief.”145 Unfortunately for employees, Russell had already limited section 409(a) 
based on legislative history and purpose; when Mertens further constricted 
section 502(a)(3), it left little of value to employees. 
D. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson  
Mertens seemed to authorize restitution under section 502(a)(3), saying that 
it was typically available in equity.146 The goal of restitution is to “prevent unjust 
enrichment of the defendant by making him give up what he wrongfully obtained 
from the plaintiff.”147 Restitution is an area of law in its own right, having its own 
Restatement148 and well-regarded treatises.149 The field is a modern invention, 
largely formed in 1937 with the Restatement on Restitution.150 The Restatement 
brought together several equitable and legal doctrines under the aegis of “the law 
of restitution” one year before equitable and legal procedures were fused in the 
federal judiciary.151 Thus, restitution includes the legal remedy of quasi-contract 
the equitable remedies of constructive trust, equitable lien, accounting for profits, 
and subrogation. 
 
141. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 2.7, at 83.  
142. Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1350.  
143. 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 150a, at 204–05.  
144. Id. § 219, at 370–71 (emphasis added).  
145. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of statutory language in ERISA authorizing injunctive 
relief. 
146. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).  
147. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1993).  
148. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1937).  
149. See generally 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).  
150. See id. § 1.1, at 4 (“The term ‘restitution’ appears in early decisions, but general recognition 
probably began with the publication of the Restatement of Restitution.” (footnote omitted)); Douglas 
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989) (stating 
Restatement on Restitution “created the field”).  
151. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 14–15 (2d ed. 1948) 
(describing attempts to unite law and equity procedure).  
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In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,152 the remedial tables 
were turned because the plan sued the employee under section 502(a)(3).153 
Great-West had paid the Knudsons’ medical expenses from an automobile 
accident. Later, the employee settled with the tortfeasor.154 The plan document 
required the Knudsons to reimburse Great-West from the recovery.155 When 
Great-West sued for reimbursement, the Knudsons refused, and the Supreme 
Court held that Great-West could not enforce its reimbursement right under 
section 502(a)(3).156 
The Court’s analysis turned on the source of recovery. Because Great-West 
sought recovery from the Knudsons’ general assets, rather than a specific fund, the 
Court found that Great-West was seeking legal, not equitable, restitution.157 Later, 
in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services,158 the plan sought payment from the 
actual funds received in settlement rather than the general assets of the employee. 
This difference allowed the Court to recognize the plan’s claim as an equitable lien 
on the funds received, thus falling within the equitable restitution allowed by 
section 502(a)(3).159 
The Court in Great-West did not have the same textual dilemma as the Court 
in Mertens. In Mertens, the Court felt compelled to interpret section 502(a)(3) 
(“equitable relief”) more narrowly than section 409(a) (“equitable or remedial 
relief”). The damages remedy naturally fell out. The Court in Great-West, though, 
had no textual reason to diminish section 502(a)(3) even further by limiting it to 
equitable restitution. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion claimed that Congress plainly meant to limit 
relief to remedies available in historic chancery practice.160 In doing so, Justice 
Scalia essentially lumped legal restitution in with the damages remedy—forms of 
relief enforceable by a money judgment, rather than a contempt decree.161 This 
enforcement mechanism is, according to Justice Scalia, what section 502(a)(3) 
prohibits.162 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that section 502(a)(3) should be read to 
allow both legal and equitable restitution.163 In fact, Great-West’s resort to 
historical chancery practice runs counter to Justice Scalia’s own definition of 
textualism—a search “for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
 
152. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).  
153. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208. 
154. Id. at 207.  
155. Id. at 207–08. 
156. Id. at 221.  
157. Id. at 212–18; cf. POMEROY, supra note 131, § 112, at 147 (“[S]imple pecuniary recovery is, in 
the vast majority of cases, legal, and not equitable, but it is not unknown in equity.”). 
158. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).  
159. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63.  
160. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217–18 (“It is, however, not our job to find reasons for what Congress 
has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done (here, limit the 
available relief) devoid of reason and effect.”).  
161. Id. at 214–16. 
162. Id. at 217–18. 
163. Id. at 224–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the 
remainder of the corpus juris.”164  
The corpus juris of ERISA’s enactment in 1974 was the eradication of 
distinctions between law and equity that had started more than a century 
earlier.165 Professor Dan Dobbs’ treatise on the law of remedies, first written in 
1973, dismissed “classification of remedies as equitable or legal,” calling it 
“misleading” and adding that “it is often unimportant to know whether a remedy 
is equitable or legal now that courts of law and equity have merged.”166 Ironically, 
Justice Scalia cited Dobbs as one of the “standard current works . . . which make 
the answer clear” when lower courts must determine whether remedies are 
equitable or legal in nature.167  
Dobbs does, in fact, provide a coherent system of remedies that supports 
Mertens but not Great-West. “Judicial remedies usually fall in one of four major 
categories. (1) Damages remedies, (2) Restitutionary remedies, (3) Coercive 
remedies, and (4) Declaratory remedies.”168 Focusing section 502(a)(3) on 
restitution distinguishes it from section 409(a). Moreover, section 502(a)(3) does 
not limit the scope of defendants—anyone can be liable under it. Yet, it could be 
unfair to subject someone to damages who did not even breach an ERISA duty. It 
would be fair, though, to subject them to restitution (i.e., the prevention of unjust 
enrichment). By limiting section 502(a)(3) to equitable restitution, however, 
Great-West simply resurrected dead law and fissioned restitution, even though the 
field was the result of a deliberate fusion of law and equity that had occurred 
decades before ERISSA was passed.  
Great-West did not reach fiduciary breaches involving plan assets, which 
remain subject to section 409(a). So, a fiduciary who wrongfully profits from the 
use of plan assets will be liable to restore those profits to the plan, whether or not 
recovery is to be made against specific property.169 Thus, the core remedies of 
trust law—redressing harm to or abuse of property—remain fully intact after 
Great-West. What was almost certainly destroyed, however, was the ability to 
redress mishandled claims and other non-asset breaches under section 502(a)(3). 
The only effective remedy for such cases is damages, which Mertens excluded from 
 
164. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997).  
165. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 151, at 13–16 (discussing distinctions between law and equity 
and attempts to reconcile the two).  
166. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 3. The main remaining importance is the availability of a jury 
trial under the Seventh Amendment and the discretionary nature of remedies. Id. § 1.2, at 8–9. 
167. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. Justice Scalia was likely referring to Dobbs’s multivolume 
treatise, rather than the hornbook, although the substance of both is the same. My reason for quoting the 
hornbook is that it is authoritative and contemporaneous with ERISA. 
168. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 1. Douglas Laycock generally follows this scheme, although he 
subdivides damages into compensatory and punitive elements and adds another class of ancillary 
remedies (such as attorney fees and contempt powers). DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 2–6 (3d ed. 2002). 
169. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (stating fiduciary is personally liable for 
damages, restitution, and other appropriate equitable or remedial relief).  
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section 502(a)(3).170 Great-West went even farther, denying any remedy under 
section 502(a)(3) if enforceable by a money judgment.171 Responding to Mertens 
and Great-West, scholars and policymakers have proposed that section 502(a)(3) 
could accommodate money damages under the “make-whole” doctrine of trust 
law, discussed in the next Part.  
IV. THE “MAKE-WHOLE” THEORY AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
A. Introduction 
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.172 exemplifies the personal devastation 
that can follow the mishandling of benefit claims. In that case, the fiduciary would 
not pay to hospitalize a pregnant employee during the third trimester despite her 
doctor’s recommendation.173 Arguably, the fiduciary breached its duties to the 
employee and caused the death of the employee’s unborn child. Employees, like 
Mrs. Corcoran, who suffer personal harm from a fiduciary breach need a money 
remedy that makes them whole. 
But ERISA currently offers them none. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Russell,174 the Supreme Court held that section 409(a) could not redress 
breaches that harm individual employees personally.175 In Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates,176 the Supreme Court held that the section 502(a)(3) does not offer the 
money remedy of damages—at least against a nonfiduciary who participates in a 
breach.177 The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on whether section 
502(a)(3) could impose liability on a breaching fiduciary, but the implication of 
Mertens is clear—damages are not available under section 502(a)(3). Without 
sections 409(a) or 502(a)(3), employees like Mrs. Corcoran have nowhere to turn, 
and they will continue to suffer personal harm without a remedy. 
Critics hope that the Supreme Court will either limit or overrule Mertens and 
open section 502(a)(3) to what they call “make-whole relief.”178 The make-whole 
theorists claim that by authorizing appropriate equitable relief, section 502(a)(3) 
adopts trust remedies which “make whole” beneficiaries harmed by breach. In 
functional terms, make-whole relief is the same as the damages remedy; each is “a 
money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses.”179 
To succeed, make-whole theory would need for the Supreme Court to reverse 
or drastically curtail Mertens. The Department of Labor contends that Mertens 
 
170. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–62 (1992). 
171. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220–21.  
172. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).  
173. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322–23.  
174. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).  
175. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140.  
176. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
177. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260–61.  
178. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of such criticisms.  
179. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 1 (“The damages remedy is a money remedy aimed at 
making good the plaintiff's losses.”).  
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denies damages against nonfiduciaries only,180 but the rationale of Mertens 
suggests otherwise. The decision turned on the monetary nature of the relief 
requested rather than the nonfiduciary status of the defendant. According to the 
Court, any general award of money is legal, not equitable, relief. Mertens, however, 
misinterpreted historical equity. Because trust law belonged to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of equity, trust remedies were exclusively equitable. This mistake 
makes Mertens a tempting target for reversal. But, as described in this Part, the 
Court would be committing another mistake by adopting the make-whole theory. 
B. The Make-Whole Theory 
In denying relief for individual harm under section 409(a), the Russell 
majority disparaged the power of ERISA to grant any remedy to an individual for 
fiduciary breach.181 According to the majority, ERISA fiduciary duties “relate to the 
proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the 
maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest.”182 Only outside the fiduciary provisions does 
ERISA create rights to enforce benefit promises.183 Later cases would make the 
handling of claims fiduciary acts,184 but they remain outside the scope of section 
409(a). 
William Brennan and three other justices concurred with the Russell 
majority.185 Alarmed by the narrowing of federal rights, they hoped to cabin 
Russell within section 409(a).186 In Brennan’s view, Mrs. Russell simply 
mispleaded her case. Section 502(a)(3), rather than 409(a), would offer relief 
because “Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable 
remedies.”187 As for trust remedies, “a fundamental concept of trust law,” 
 
180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 14.  
181. See Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1341–42. The Court later allowed individual 
remedies under section 502(a)(3). Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).  
182. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1985). The focus on asset 
management seeped into the Court’s preemption analysis a few years after Russell. See Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1989) (exempting vacation-benefit plan from ERISA coverage because it 
had no associated plan assets).  
183. Russell, 473 U.S. at 143. Part 4 of ERISA Title I contains the fiduciary provisions, whereas Part 
5 contains enforcement provisions. 
184. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004) (stating benefit determination is 
“part and parcel” of ordinary fiduciary responsibilities); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) 
(concluding that section 502’s “catchall” provisions provide for appropriate equitable relief for injuries 
caused by violations that section 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy).  
185. They were Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  
186. Later cases partially vindicated Brennan, holding that individuals could seek relief for a 
fiduciary breach under section 502(a)(3) and could even seek relief under section 409(a) if the harm 
was to assets held in an account for the individual. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 
256 (2008) (finding breach that harmed assets in defined contribution plan fell under § 409(a)); Varity, 
516 U.S. at 509–11 (holding section 502(a)(3) is broad enough to permit individual relief for fiduciary 
breach).  
187. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157–58. The concurrence does not expressly say that section 502(a)(3) 
incorporates trust remedies. But the concurrence repeatedly says that section 502(a)(3) redresses 
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according to Brennan, “is that courts ‘will give to the beneficiaries of a trust such 
remedies as are necessary for the protection of their interests.’”188  
Following Russell, the Court in Mertens denied money damages under section 
502(a)(3) under the (incorrect) view that an award of money is legal and outside 
the “appropriate equitable relief” of section 502(a)(3).189 In dissent, Byron White 
and three other justices190 detailed the make-whole theory. Rather than denying 
monetary awards,  
 “[t]he traditional ‘equitable remedies’ available to a trust beneficiary 
included compensatory damages. Equity ‘endeavor[ed] as far as possible 
to replace the parties in the same situation as they would have been in, if 
no breach of trust had been committed.’ This included, where necessary, 
the payment of a monetary award to make the victims of the breach 
whole.”191  
Thus, according to White, the “appropriate equitable relief” of section 502(a)(3) 
includes the “make-whole relief” of trust law.192 The Department of Labor, 
scholars, judges, and justices have since rallied behind the make-whole theory and 
called for damages under section 502(a)(3).193 
Their calls, however, have not changed the law. The Department of Labor has 
tried to distinguish Mertens, arguing that it bars damages only against 
nonfiduciaries.194 These attempts have gone nowhere, and appellate judges 
routinely deny make-whole relief, albeit under protest.195 The rationale of Mertens 
turns on the nature of relief rather than the identity of the defendant. Change, say 
the appellate judges, must come from the Supreme Court or Congress. Congress 
has done nothing, nor has the Supreme Court. Concurring in Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila,196 a 2004 preemption decision, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer pleaded for 
the Court to revisit Mertens and allow make-whole relief under section 
502(a)(3).197  
In 2008, the Court declined these pleas by denying certiorari in Amschwand v. 
Spherion Corp.198 Thomas Amschwand, afflicted with cancer, had left work on a 
medical leave but tried to maintain life insurance coverage from his employer, 
 
fiduciary breaches and supports the argument with repeated references to trust law. See, e.g., id. 
188. Id. at 157 (quoting 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 199, at 1638 (1967)).  
189. See generally Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).  
190. The other justices were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O’Connor. Id. at 263 
(White, J., dissenting).  
191. Id. at 266 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting JAMES HILL, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO TRUSTEES, THEIR POWERS, DUTIES, PRIVILEGES, AND LIABILITIES 522 (4th ed. 
1845)).  
192. Id. at 266–67.  
193. See Harthill, supra note 11, at 723–26 (providing examples of support and criticism of the 
“make-whole” theory).  
194. Id. at 747–48.  
195. Id. at 724 & n.14, 15 & 19.  
196. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).  
197. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
198. 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008).  
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Spherion.199 During this time, Spherion replaced its former insurer with Aetna. 
The new Aetna policy excluded employees on medical leave, like Amschwand, 
until they returned to work for one day. This exclusion was not communicated to 
Amschwand, who arguably could have returned to work for a day to keep his 
coverage.200 Aetna’s policy purported to waive the exclusion for those employees 
identified by Spherion as being on preexisting medical leave.201 Spherion did not 
transmit Amschwand’s name to Aetna, and Amschwand did not receive coverage 
when the new policy became effective. Spherion assured Amschwand he was 
covered.202 He never returned to work but continued paying premiums until his 
death.203 His widow filed a claim for benefits, but Aetna denied the claim because 
of the exclusion.204 The widow then sued for make-whole relief under section 
502(a)(3).205 
The Fifth Circuit denied the widow relief, relying on Mertens and its 
progeny.206 The Department of Labor and Solicitor General viewed Amschwand as 
a vehicle for the Supreme Court to modify or overrule Mertens.207 By following 
Mertens, the Fifth Circuit would not redress a clear fiduciary breach that 
devastated an employee’s widow.208 Thus, the United States supported Mrs. 
Amschwand’s petition for certiorari,209 but the Supreme Court nevertheless 
denied it.210 The make-whole theory may remain alive, but just barely, after 
Amschwand.211 
 
199. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2007). 
200. Id. at 344. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 343. The decisions of the Fifth Circuit and district court suggest that Mrs. Amschwand 
sued only under section 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty. Mrs. Amschwand should have also sued 
under section 502(a)(1)(B) as she was not seeking extra-contractual damages but simply benefits due. 
Also, the premiums that Mr. Amschwand paid to Spherion were plan assets. Spherion breached its 
fiduciary duties by not dedicating these assets to the purchase of a life insurance policy for Mr. 
Amschwand. Under LaRue, Spherion could be held liable for this breach with respect to assets, even 
though the remedy would flow only to Mrs. Amschwand.  
206. See id. at 343, 345–48 (observing that Supreme Court had already limited relief available 
under section 502(a)(3) to remedies typically awarded in courts of equity). 
207. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12. 
208. Id. at 20. 
209. Id. at 21. 
210. See Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (denying petition for certiorari); see 
also Andrew L. Oringer, A Regulatory Vacuum Leaves Gaping Wounds—Can Common Sense Offer a Better 
Way to Address the Pain of ERISA Preemption?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 409, 421–23 (2008) (providing 
a detailed description of Amschwand).  
211. Commentators differ on whether the make-whole theory remains viable at all after 
Amschwand. Compare Thomas P. Gies & Jane R. Foster, Leaving Well Enough Alone: Reflections on the 
Current State of ERISA Remedial Law, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 449, 467 (2008) (arguing that Court’s 
refusal to hear Amschwand conclusively excludes make-whole relief from section 502(a)(3)), with 
Secunda, supra note 6, at 174 (arguing that make-whole theory remains viable).  
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C. How the Trust-Law Analogy Fails 
In interpreting ERISA, the Supreme Court follows trust law (or at least tries 
to). Perhaps its most comprehensive application of trust law to ERISA is Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.212 In Firestone, one company bought a division of 
another company.213 The employees of the acquired division claimed that the 
transaction resulted in their termination of employment, thus entitling them to 
severance benefits.214 The employer denied the claim because the employees 
continued working for the acquiring employer.215 The question before the Court 
was how to review the employer’s decisionmaking as the plan’s fiduciary.216  
The Supreme Court decided Firestone using the law of trusts, likening the 
ERISA fiduciary to a traditional trustee.217 According to this trust-regulatory 
model, the Court ruled that fiduciary decisionmaking is generally reviewed de 
novo.218 However, if the governing document reserves discretion to the employer, 
then the federal courts will overturn the fiduciary’s decision only if its decision is 
arbitrary and capricious.219 The natural outcome of Firestone was that every well-
advised employer amended its plans to reserve to it—or its appointed fiduciary—
the appropriate discretion in administering plan claims. So, the de facto standard 
of review in ERISA cases asks whether the denial was arbitrary and capricious. 
Rather than entangling itself with state trust law, the Court could have 
answered Firestone under the text of ERISA. Firestone involved an ERISA fiduciary 
who had to decide whether employees were eligible for benefits under the 
standard set forth in the plan document. Trust law gives a clear analogue in those 
very common situations in which a trustee is directed to pay income or principal 
for the “support” or “education” of a beneficiary. In those cases, the beneficiary 
cannot challenge the amount that “the trustee in the exercise of a sound discretion 
deems necessary for [the beneficiary’s] education or support.”220 Under trust law, 
then, eligibility for trust distributions involves trustee discretion that will be 
overturned only if abused. And, the Court had no need to search through 
Restatements of Trusts to find this answer. The text of ERISA, like trust law, 
imposes a duty of prudence (i.e., reasonableness) on its fiduciaries in the 
administration of employee benefit plans.221 As a textual matter, the Court could 
have simply said that the benefit determinations would be subject to the same 
standard of reasonableness that applies to all other fiduciary acts. 
 
212. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  
213. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105.  
214. Id. at 105–06. 
215. Id. at 106.  
216. Id. at 108.  
217. Id. at 110–11. 
218. Id. at 112. 
219. See id. at 109–12 (observing that federal courts have adopted arbitrary and capricious 
standard).  
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 cmt. e. (1959).  
221. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (requiring fiduciaries to act with 
diligence and prudence).  
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The use of trust law, rather than the text of ERISA, in Firestone was peculiar 
because the severance plan was not even a trust. ERISA health and welfare plans 
are often not trusts.222 The standard definition of a trust is “a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to 
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of 
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to 
create it.”223 Scott’s treatise breaks this definition into five components: 
(1) a trust is a relationship; 
(2) it is a relationship of a fiduciary character; 
(3) it is a relationship with respect to property, not one involving merely 
personal duties; 
(4) it subjects the person who holds title to the property to duties to 
deal with it for the benefit of charity or [sic] one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee; and 
(5) it arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create the 
relationship.224  
All ERISA plans satisfy (1) because they are relationships in the sense used 
by Scott, as they involve both the rights of employees225 and the duties of the 
ERISA fiduciaries.226 As for (5), ERISA plans are voluntary structures, entered into 
only with the manifest, written intent of the employer.227 Because plans are 
voluntary, the Supreme Court has often hesitated to rule against employers out of 
fear that additional liability will thwart the formation of ERISA plans.228 Even 
 
222. Professor Donald Bogan has previously criticized the role of trust law in ERISA cases. Under 
Firestone, courts will defer to a fiduciary’s denial of benefits if the plan expressly grants discretion to the 
fiduciary. Professor Bogan notes that ERISA plans share far more in common with insurance contracts 
than with donative trusts. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential 
Review in Employee Benefit Claims—Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
147, 196 (2009) (“These considerations, which form the foundation for court deference under donative 
trust law, have no relation to a contract of insurance.”); see also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking 
Firestone in Light of Great-West—Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in 
Welfare Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 694 (2004) (concluding article with plea for “re-
evaluation of Firestone, the ERISA standard of review issue, and the question of a plan participant's right 
to a jury trial in claims for benefits due under an ERISA plan”); Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: 
No Further Inquiry into Conflicted Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 637, 684 (2005) 
(arguing that courts “have not adhered to trust law's no-further-inquiry rule in the analysis of what 
standard of review to apply in ERISA benefits claims litigation tarnished by a plan administrator's 
conflict of interest”).  
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 1.  
224. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.1.3 (5th ed. 2006).  
225. Cf. ERISA §§ 502, 503, 514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1133, 1144 (detailing enforcement rights under 
ERISA).  
226. Cf. id. §§ 101–05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021–31 (detailing reporting and disclosure requirements); id. 
§§ 401–14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–14 (detailing fiduciary duties).  
227. See id. § 402(a)(1), 9 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (“Every employee benefit plan shall be established 
and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”). 
228. See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); Aetna Health Inc. v. 
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376 (2002); 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 42 
(1987).  
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though ERISA does contain mandatory terms that cannot be altered by the 
governing plan document,229 employers enter into ERISA plans only voluntarily. 
The text of ERISA mandates fiduciary duties, which are arguably satisfying the 
requirement of (2) that the relationship be of a fiduciary character.230  
What remains a problem, however, is fitting ERISA plans into characteristics 
(3) and (4) dealing with trust property. While “[a]n interest in property is always 
an element of a trust,”231 many ERISA plans have no associated assets. They are 
simply promises to pay benefits from the general funds of the employer,232 
involving “merely personal duties” of the employer.233 Trust law does not act as a 
less formal body of contract law, enforcing gratuitous promises unsupported by 
consideration. “The promise to give cannot be tortured into a trust declaration . . . 
.”234 This is because personal promises are not property. Or, as Justice Scalia once 
quipped, “[a] trust without a res can no more be created by legislative decree than 
can a pink rock-candy mountain.”235  
One might claim that this black-letter critique is unfair to the trust-model of 
ERISA. Austin Scott, author of the five characteristics, viewed trust law as property 
law, a means by which the settlor grants a property interest, enforceable by courts 
in equity, to a beneficiary.236 A more modern account, still based on property, 
comes from Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, who claim that trust serves to 
establish the rights of different creditors.237 In particular, trust law serves to grant 
broad power to the trustee while protecting trust property from the claims of the 
trustee’s personal creditors.238 Robert Sitkoff proposes a similar account, viewing 
trust law as a means to control the agency costs that come with broad managerial 
power over assets.239 
 
229. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (requiring fiduciary to administer plan 
according to plan document “insofar as . . . consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]”); id. § 410, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1110) (prohibiting the exculpation of plan fiduciaries from ERISA liability).  
230. See id. § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (mandating that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interests of the participants and the beneficiaries”).  
231. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 1. 
232. See Muir, supra note 31 (explaining welfare benefit plans often do not need to establish trust 
since benefits are payable from plan sponsor’s general fund). 
233. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 224. 
234. Unthank v. Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1964). Even modern authorities follow this 
rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16(2) (2003) (“If a property owner intends to make an 
outright gift inter vivos but fails to make the transfer that is required in order to do so, the gift intention 
will not be given effect by treating it as a declaration of trust.”).  
235. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia might have been 
thinking of the mythical hobo paradise praised in the song “Big Rock Candy Mountain.” See generally 
HARRY MCCLINTOCK, Big Rock Candy Mountain, on O BROTHER WHERE ART THOU? (Lost Highway Records 
2000).  
236. See Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 
269, 270 (1917) (observing that trust is formed by transfer of property and distinguishing trust law 
from contract law).  
237. See generally Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998).  
238. Id. at 437–38. 
239. See generally Sitkoff, supra note 53.  
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While Scott’s property-centric view might be considered the dominant one, it 
has detractors. The most pointed is Professor John Langbein, who claimed that 
“[t]rusts are deals.”240 Langbein does not appear to go so far as to claim, though, 
that trust law has no need for property, rather that the “trust deal” is the 
“distinguishing feature of the trust” which “defines the powers and 
responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property.”241 The actual 
conveyance of property is, in Langbein’s view, a mere “background event.”242 
Trusts might be deals, but they are deals about property. Property is the key 
feature of trusts for purposes of this Article because the rights of a trust 
beneficiary are, ultimately, rights to trust property. The trust beneficiary can 
demand that the trustee administer trust property according to the trust 
instrument and the fiduciary duties of trust law. But the beneficiary cannot go 
beyond that and demand financial support directly from the trustee or settlor. In 
contrast, many ERISA plans have no trust property or have trust property that 
merely secures personal promises to provide benefits.  
The line between promise and property, though, is not always clear. Almost 
ninety years ago, Roscoe Pound wrote, “[w]ealth, in a commercial age, is made up 
largely of promises.”243 Most financial assets could be described as promises (e.g., 
stocks, bonds, mutual fund holdings).244  
Financial assets, even if “promises,” can be bought and sold by the trustee. 
Without the duty of loyalty, trustees could enjoy these financial assets for 
themselves. In contrast, a trustee’s own promise looks less like property subject to 
fiduciary administration. For this reason, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
which was effective at the enactment of ERISA, prohibited the creation of a trust 
with obligations enforceable against the trustee personally.245 So, “if a person 
makes a note payable to himself as trustee for a third person, or if he makes a note 
payable to bearer and declares himself trustee of the note for a third person, no 
trust is created, and the the [sic] third person has no enforceable claim against the 
maker.”246  
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts liberalizes this prohibition somewhat 
stating that “a chose in action consisting of a legally enforceable claim against the 
trustee may be held in trust.”247 In order to create a trust, though, the settlor must 
 
240. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 671. 
241. Id. at 627. 
242. Id. 
243. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 133 (8th prtg. 1966), quoted in 
Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 637. 
244. Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 13, at 638; see also BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 
supra note 13, § 115, at 333–37 (discussing “notes, bonds, obligations under other contracts, shares of 
stock, bank deposits, and claims under an insurance policy” as common choses in action held in trust 
(footnotes omitted)).  
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft. No. 4, 1957) (“An obligor cannot be 
trustee of the duties which he owes to the obligee . . . .”).  
246. Id. § 87 cmt. a.  
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 40 cmt. b (2003). The position of the Third Restatement may 
reflect the law at the time ERISA was passed. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 224, § 10.11, at 580–82 (“The 
Third Restatement [abandons] the traditional rule and . . . acknowledges that a trustee can hold his or 
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actually declare herself trustee of the chose in action or transfer it to a third party 
trustee.248 The Third Restatement will not torture a contract into a trust and 
distinguishes between promise and property as follows: 
 10. In consideration of valuable services that have subsequently been 
performed by B, A promised B that on the first of the next month he (A) 
will transfer certain securities to T in trust for B. Although no trust 
arises until A transfers the securities to T in trust, A is liable for breach 
of contract if he fails to create the trust. 
 11. In consideration of funds that have since been received from B’s 
parents, A executed a signed writing promising T that on the first of the 
next month he (A) will convey Blackacre to T in trust for B. A delivers 
the writing to T, informing her that it is his intention thereby to create a 
trust for B’s benefit. T thereby acquires a right to specifically enforce the 
contract or to recover damages from A if he breaks his promise, and she 
now holds these rights in trust for B.249  
Even if one thinks that the unfunded ERISA plan resembles illustration eleven 
rather than ten, the plan must clear even more hurdles to be a trust under the 
Third Restatement. A chose in action must be “definite or ascertainable.”250 So, 
there is no trust with respect to a chose in action that “remains wholly in the 
control of the settlor or if its description is so indefinite that it cannot be 
ascertained.”251 Yet, “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under 
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.”252 
Even the most modern, post-ERISA authorities would not recognize an unfunded 
benefit promise as a trust. 
D. Make-Whole Relief Redresses Harm to Trust Property 
Critics of ERISA decisions point to trust law as the way to expand remedies 
under section 502(a)(3). Yet, the necessity of property divides ERISA and trust 
law. Without property (a res), one cannot create a trust, but one can create an 
ERISA plan. This subsection shows that property is just as central to trust 
remedies as it is to trust formation. 
 
her own debt in trust for another.”).  
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 cmt. g (2003) (“If, however, a person makes or causes to 
be made an enforceable promise to pay money or transfer property to another as trustee, and if the 
person (with the expressed or implied acceptance of the intended trustee) also manifests an intention 
immediately to create a trust of the promisee's rights, a trust is created at the time of the contract, with a 
chose in action (the rights under that contract) then being held for the beneficiaries by the trustee.”).  
249. Id. § 10 cmt. g, illus. 10–11.  
250. Id. § 40 cmt. e.  
251. Id. 
252. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). Moreover, the trustee of a 
revocable trust owes a fiduciary duty only to the settlor rather than other beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. a(1) (2007) (“[D]espite the lack of enforceable fiduciary duties in these 
circumstances, a valid trust exists . . . .”).  
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1. Professor Langbein and the Bogert Treatise 
The make-whole theory originated in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in 
Russell and Justice White’s dissent in Mertens, but it has found its most complete 
exposition in a 2003 article by Professor John Langbein.253 Langbein repeatedly 
refers to make-whole relief as “routine” under trust law,254 but the trust 
authorities he cites do not fill the void of current ERISA remedies. The centerpiece 
of Langbein’s argument is a passage from the Bogert treatise on trusts, which 
reads as follows: 
 The extent of liability in the cases within this section is determined by 
the general rule that the object of damages is to make the injured party 
whole. Stated otherwise, the goal is to put the injured party in the same 
condition in which they would have been had the wrong had not been 
committed and the trustee had done his or her duty. Both direct and 
consequential damages may be awarded. Costs, counsel fees and 
expenses of litigation would fall within the latter type of award and are 
granted by the courts in their discretion when they deem the breach has 
been the cause of their being incurred.255 
Langbein misuses this passage, failing to note that his centerpiece quote deals 
with the investment duties of a trustee, a point the Bogert treatise makes perfectly 
clear.256 But, Langbein is not agitating for a make-whole theory to deal with 
investment losses, which ERISA already redresses under section 409(a). What 
Langbein needs, in order to make his case, are trust authorities that redress 
personal harm to beneficiaries. 
The closest Langbein comes is another passage from Bogert that states:  
 In suits to collect money from a trustee for breach of trust, the direct 
damages will usually be measured by the difference between the value 
of the beneficiary’s rights to principal and income before and after the 
breach, but consequential damages may also be awarded, and 
exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded where malice or fraud 
is involved.257  
This passage appears promising, but the cases Bogert cites also deal with trust 
investments.258 The sole outlier, decided after the passage of ERISA, imposed 
 
253. Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1319–20. Langbein’s article has been relied upon by 
concurring justices in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and 
by the Solicitor General. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 13. 
254. See, e.g., Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 22, at 1320 (“[T]he drafters of ERISA were 
evoking the relief routinely obtainable for breach of trust.”); id. at 1321 (referring to “routine make-
whole relief”).  
255. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 701, quoted in Langbein, Trail of Error, supra 
note 22, at 1319–20.  
256. BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 701 (“The object of this chapter is to discuss the 
extent of the trustee's financial liability for breach of his duties with regard to making (or failing to 
make), retaining, or selling trust investments. Additionally, it will discuss the methods that the courts 
use in measuring that liability.”).  
257. Id. § 862.  
258. Id. § 862, at 50 n.33.  
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damages upon a trustee based not on its acts as trustee but on its contractual 
estate-planning relationship with a beneficiary.259  
I do not claim that trust law never redresses personal harm to beneficiaries. 
For example, the court in Marsman v. Nasca260 appeared ready to impose personal 
liability upon a trustee for the harm he caused to a beneficiary’s personal 
interests. The beneficiary’s widow convinced the court that the beneficiary had to 
convey his home because the trustee failed to provide for the beneficiary’s 
support, as required by the trust agreement.261 Forcing the trustee to pay the 
withheld funds to the widow was easy, but arguably does not make her whole 
because of the loss of the home. The court appeared willing to impose additional 
personal liability upon the trustee; it elected against doing so, however, because 
the trust agreement contained an exculpatory clause.262 Perhaps similar cases 
exist, but they are not evident from either Langbein or Bogert. The make-whole 
doctrine is routine to investment losses but not personal harm. 
2. The Remedies of the Second Restatement of Trusts 
The natural place to look for trust remedies is the Second Restatement, which 
reigned as the authority on trust law when Congress passed ERISA in 1974. The 
later Third Restatement and Uniform Trust Code cannot be evidence of the trust 
system Congress intended to adopt. But, like Bogert’s treatise, the Second 
Restatement does not address personal harm suffered by beneficiaries. In fact, it 
does not speak of make-whole relief at all outside its citations to ERISA cases. 
With limited exception, the remedies available to a trust beneficiary against a 
trustee are exclusively equitable.263 The only legal remedy available is an action to 
enforce an unconditional and immediate right to payment of money or transfer of 
personal property from the trust.264 The remaining trust remedies, all equitable, 
allow a trust beneficiary to bring a suit to: 
(a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;  
(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;  
(c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;  
(d) to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property 
and administer the trust; [or]  
 
259. Merrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 1095, 1101 (4th Cir. 1988).  
260. 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). In Marsman, the court found the trustee to have 
breached by not inquiring into the financial needs of his beneficiary. Id. at 1029–31. The beneficiary was 
forced to convey a remainder interest in his house to his stepdaughter. Upon the beneficiary’s death, his 
widow sued the trustee. Id. at 1029. The court ordered the trustee to transfer funds to the widow that 
should have been paid to the beneficiary. Id. at 1031. The court would not, however, impose personal 
liability on the trustee because of an exculpatory clause. Id. at 1033. Marsman is well known to many 
professors who teach trusts and estates because of its inclusion in JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND ESTATES 598–604 (8th ed. 2009).  
261. Marsman, 573 N.E.2d at 1030.  
262. Id. at 1032–33.  
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).  
264. Id. § 198.  
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(e) to remove the trustee.”265  
The third remedy, allowing a suit to “redress a breach of trust,” should be the 
core of the make-whole theory. But, the redress allowed by the Second 
Restatement concerns itself with harms to or abuse of trust property. To quote: 
If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with  
 (a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from 
the breach of trust; or  
 (b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust; or  
 (c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there 
had been no breach of trust.266  
The Second Restatement, just like ERISA section 409(a), redresses harm to or 
abuse of plan assets.267 
The make-whole theory would need to reverse cases, like Corcoran, that 
preclude relief for wrongful denials and delays. The Second Restatement 
redresses these breaches but only barely. If the denial or delay is an intentional 
breach, the beneficiary is entitled to interest: 
 If the breach of trust consists in the failure to pay to the beneficiary 
trust funds to which he is entitled, the trustee is ordinarily chargeable 
with interest at the legal rate if he intentionally violated his duty to the 
beneficiary in withholding payment. If, however, his failure to pay was 
due to a reasonable doubt as to his duty to make payment, he is not 
liable, during the period while the question of his duty is being litigated, 
for any interest except such as he has actually received or should have 
received during that period. In such a case the trustee should ordinarily 
not invest the money but should deposit it in a bank in order that he 
may be in a position to pay it over immediately if the court should so 
decree.268  
3. Professor Harthill’s Defense of the Make-Whole 
Professor Susan Harthill defends the make-whole theory from the charge that 
trust remedies redress harm only to trust property.269 It is true that she identifies 
examples of relief not predicated upon harm to plan assets. But, the relief is not 
make-whole (i.e., damages) but restitution. The primary goal of damages is to 
compensate a plaintiff for loss.270 In contrast, restitution “prevent[s] unjust 
enrichment of the defendant by making him give up what he wrongfully obtained 
from the plaintiff.”271 The ERISA make-whole theory is one of damages as it would 
compensate the plaintiff. 
 
265. Id. § 199.  
266. Id. § 205.  
267. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 409(a).  
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 207 cmt. c.  
269. Harthill, supra note 11, at 723.  
270. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 3. Dobbs includes punitive damages within the category of 
damages while Laycock places them within a separate category. LAYCOCK, supra note 133, at 2–6. 
271. DOBBS, supra note 74, § 1.1, at 4. 
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Professor Harthill points to a comment in the Second Restatement “[w]here a 
trustee of shares of stock uses his power as shareholder to make an improper 
profit.”272 In this case, the trustee “is liable for the profit so made” even if the 
breach has not diminished trust property.273 But this is not make-whole relief; 
neither the trust estate nor its beneficiaries have suffered harm that must be made 
whole. Instead, it is restitution, imposed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the 
disloyal fiduciary. And, ERISA section 409(a) expressly imposes restitution on 
disloyal fiduciaries274 as does trust law.275 
What Professor Harthill needs are trust authorities redressing harm that is 
personal to the beneficiaries. She discusses West v. Biscoe,276 in which “the settlor 
left land to her sons on the condition that they paid $500 to each of her two 
granddaughters.”277 The sons did not perform on the obligation. The widower of 
one of the granddaughters sued in equity, and the chancellor imposed a personal 
obligation of payment upon the sons.278 Professor Harthill characterizes the case 
as a breach of trust,279 but it was not. The sons were not trustees, and the 
chancellor dismissed the bill of complaint as to the actual trustee.280 Instead, the 
settlor created an equitable charge upon the sons,281 which is not a fiduciary 
relationship.282 
The title of Professor Harthill’s article, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole,” 
acknowledges the difficulty in using trust law to redress personal harm to 
beneficiaries.283 To date, though, neither peg nor hole has given way. Courts 
routinely deny relief when harm does not fall into the trust model of section 
 
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. o (1959); Harthill, supra note 11, at 759 (stating 
“a trustee who receives a bonus or commission from a third party for an act done by the trustee in 
connection with trust administration is liable for breach of the duty of loyalty”).  
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. o (1959). 
274. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (forcing breaching fiduciaries to “restore to 
[the] plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan”).  
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (holding trustee liable for “any profit made by 
him through the breach of trust”).  
276. 6 H. & J. 460 (Md. 1825). 
277. Harthill, supra note 11, at 774 (citing West, 6 H. & J. at 460–61). This quote misstates the facts 
slightly, as the settlor created a trust during her lifetime, not by will, and the charge was for £500, not 
$500. West, 6 H. & J., at 460–61.  
278. Harthill, supra note 11, at 774–75.  
279. Id. 
280. West, 6 H & J. at 463. 
281. Id. at 466 (“[T]he portion claimed is a charge in equity upon the estate conveyed in trust . . . 
.”). 
282. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 13, § 31 (“[A]bsence of a fiduciary duty in the 
equitable charge is the most important distinction between a charge and trust.”). West held that the 
charge would be enforceable against the sons personally in equity. West, 6 H & J. at 469. The Bogert 
treatise, though, states personal obligation is enforceable at law. See BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra 
note 13, § 31 (“[A] charge beneficiary has two legal remedies: (1) to impose a personal obligation 
against the transferee subject to the charge and (2) to impose in rem rights against the property.”).  
283. Indeed, Professor Harthill acknowledges that the trust authorities do not satisfactorily 
answer the question. See Harthill, supra note 11, at 765 (“[T]he Bogert treatise does not satisfactorily 
resolve the debate of what conditions attached to make-whole relief . . . .”). 
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409(a). The make-whole theory would grant relief only if the Supreme Court is 
willing to shave the sharp edges off of trust remedies. 
E. Conclusion 
After Russell284 limited section 409(a) to plan-level and asset-based breaches, 
section 502(a)(3) was the only place left to redress harm personal to 
beneficiaries. With the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Amschwand,285 
though, the faint hope for make-whole relief under of section 502(a)(3) may have 
flickered out. 
The make-whole theory’s practical failure follows its theoretical weakness. 
Make-whole theorists must claim that Congress incorporated trust remedies into 
section 502(a)(3) by granting “appropriate equitable relief.” Yet, trust remedies 
focus on the integrity of trust assets, just as Russell focused ERISA remedies on the 
integrity of plan assets. Trust law is the problem with ERISA remedies, not the 
solution. 
Rather than looking to trust law and cryptic references to equity, the courts 
and commentators should look again at the text of section 409(a) to redress all 
fiduciary breaches, including personal harm to beneficiaries. Russell, of course, 
precludes this interpretation of section 409(a). But, the rationale—if not 
holding—of Mertens precludes a court from granting damages under section 
502(a)(3). Remedial expansion can come only after the Supreme Court revisits its 
precedents, and reformers should start at the beginning with Russell and the text 
of section 409(a). 
V. OVERTURNING RUSSELL AND REDRESSING ALL FIDUCIARY BREACHES UNDER ERISA 
§409(a) 
Section 409(a) allows a court to impose upon a breaching fiduciary such 
“equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.” 286 Yet, reading 
the statute as a whole and in light of the legislative history, the Court concluded 
that Congress was “primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, 
and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights 
of the an individual beneficiary.”287 Prior scholars have focused their attention on 
why Congress intended to grant full remedies under ERISA.288 
Rather than duplicate those efforts, I hope to bolster them with arguments 
from the text of the statute. Here (again) is the text of section 409(a), black-lined 
to highlight and aid the reader in evaluating the textual merits of Russell: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by 
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
 
284. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of Russell.  
285. See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amschwand.  
286. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138 (1984). 
287. Id. at 142.  
288. See generally, Harthill, supra note 11.  
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such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary.289  
Relief under the black-lined text flows exclusively to the plan since the breaching 
fiduciary must “make good to such plan any losses” and “restore to such plan any 
profits” associated with the breach.290 Thus, the Court found the black-lined text 
establishes a context of plan-level relief that must apply to a later grant of 
“equitable or remedial relief” as well.291 
The Court’s reasoning was based implicitly on the canon of ejusdem generis, 
which is “[a] canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a 
list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only 
items of the same type as those listed.”292 The black-lined text is not, however, a 
lengthy list that establishes an unmistakable context of plan-level relief. 
Alternatively, the Court could have been applying noscitur a sociis, the “canon of 
construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be 
determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”293 For example, the Court 
seemed to think that referring to a fiduciary “with respect to a plan” made the 
focus on plan-level relief clear.294 But, this is simply the unnecessarily long phrase 
used by the ERISA definitional section; every fiduciary is a “fiduciary with respect 
to a plan.”295  
The text does, however, pose a conundrum. A broad interpretation of the 
general phrase “equitable or remedial relief” might render the specific forms of 
plan-level relief superfluous. Yet, a narrow interpretation might render the 
general phrase itself superfluous.296 The Court chose the latter, but never 
explained in Russell exactly what type of relief would come under “equitable and 
remedial relief.” Later cases under section 502(a)(3) eroded the need for 
“equitable or remedial relief” under section 409(a).297 The Court interpreted 
section 502(a)(3)’s grant of “equitable relief” as redressing a fiduciary breach in 
Varity and as benefitting the plan as a whole in Harris Trust. 
 I suggest the following interpretation of section 409(a). The plan-level relief, 
black-lined above, adopts the traditional remedies for breach of trust. They neatly 
track the remedies of the Second Restatement, as discussed above, by protecting 
the integrity of plan assets. Nevertheless, Congress went beyond trust remedies by 
 
289. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006). 
290. Id. 
291. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 (emphasis omitted).  
292. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).  
293. Id. at 1087. 
294. Russell, 473 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).  
295. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).  
296. Cf. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at 
374 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that canon applies where “the class is not exhausted by the enumeration”). 
The same parties that can enforce section 409(a) have independent authority under section 502(a)(3) to 
seek “equitable relief” against breaching fiduciaries. The Secretary of Labor technically proceeds under 
section 502(a)(5), which is indistinguishable from 502(a)(3) for this purpose. 
297. See generally Russell, 473 U.S. 134. 
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also granting “such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate” 298 to redress fiduciary breach, including redress for harm to a 
beneficiary’s personal interest.  
This interpretation achieves all the goals of the make-whole theory without 
contorting the remedies of trust law or the text of ERISA. Most importantly, it 
avoids historical equity. Section 409(a) authorizes “equitable and remedial relief,” 
which is obviously broader than the limited “equitable relief” available under 
section 502(a)(3). The logical reading of “equitable or remedial relief” includes the 
main forms of monetary remedies: damages (i.e., making plaintiffs whole) and 
restitution (i.e., preventing defendant’s unjust enrichment). Section 409(a) 
specifies plan-level damages (“losses to the plan”) and plan-level restitution 
(“profits of [the] fiduciary”) before granting general relief (“equitable or remedial 
relief”). Russell interpreted the specific relief as focusing on types of plan-level 
relief but could have readily found it focusing on types of damages and restitution. 
Yet this is not the most important contextual clue. Section 409(a) redresses 
fiduciary breaches specifically whereas section 502(a)(3) redresses ERISA 
violations generically. This fact alone supports using section 409(a) to redress all 
ERISA fiduciary breaches, not just those involving plan assets or the plan as a 
whole. Courts should redress fiduciary breaches with the provision drafted for 
that purpose. 
Redressing fiduciary breach under section 409(a) would also relieve the 
pressure placed on section 502(a)(3). Despite bungling historical equity, Mertens 
contains a core truth. “‘Equitable’ relief,” Justice Scalia wrote, “must mean 
something less than all relief.”299 Damages naturally fall from section 502(a)(3) 
because “simple pecuniary recovery is, in the vast majority of cases, legal, and not 
equitable.”300 Moreover, an expansive section 502(a)(3) potentially subjects 
nonfiduciaries to damages, even though they generally owe no duties to 
employees covered by ERISA plans. In the case of fiduciary breach, section 409(a) 
should offer full relief. In cases of other ERISA violations, section 502(a)(3) should 
ordinarily offer narrower relief. 
Great-West was unnecessary because Mertens, by excluding damages, had 
already solved the textual problem of limiting section 502(a)(3). Once damages 
were removed from section 502(a)(3), there was no further need to limit its scope 
to ensure textual coherence. Restitution—the prevention of unjust enrichment—
should always be available in its legal and equitable forms under section 
502(a)(3). Historically and procedurally, restitution mixes law and equity. Yet, as 
Professor Dobbs points out, “[t]he substantive basis of restitution is related to 
substantive equity. That is, courts applying substantive equity and courts applying 
the law of unjust enrichment are both applying a law of ‘good conscience.’”301 
The system I propose is admittedly only a sketch of ERISA remedies, 
intended to show that the text, rather than trust law, is the solution to ERISA 
remedies. Courts would still need to consider a variety of issues under section 
 
298. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
299. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993).  
300. 1 POMEROY, supra note 131, § 112, at 147.  
301. See DOBBS, supra note 74, § 4.1, at 370. 
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409(a), such as whether to grant punitive damages, whether to redress 
noneconomic loss (e.g., pain and suffering), and how to limit consequential 
damages.302 ERISA section 510 may also pose a problem. It prohibits employers 
from interfering with their employee’s rights to benefits; firing an employee on 
the eve of vesting is the prototypical violation.303 Since section 510 contains no 
express remedies, employees must turn to section 502(a)(3) for enforcement. 
Some courts, however, have denied awards for backpay on the grounds that they 
are legal relief.304 Yet, section 510 is equally problematic under the make-whole 
theory, which addresses only fiduciary breaches not employment decisions. It may 
be that section 510 needs its own separate enforcement mechanism by legislation.  
To conclude, the Supreme Court should overturn Russell and allow damages 
for all fiduciary breaches under section 409(a). Doing so maintains the textual 
integrity of section 409(a) and 502(a)(3), which need not be contorted to 
accommodate the make-whole theory. Section 502(a)(3) should focus on 
restitution, which is substantive—if not historically or procedurally—equitable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite its ancient and far-reaching history, trust law is, in a crucial way, 
narrower than the 36-year-old ERISA. A trustee commits to manage trust 
property—not her personal resources—for the benefit of the beneficiary. In 
contrast, ERISA health and welfare plans often impose “merely personal duties” 
on the employer or administrator to pay benefits. Trusts are deals about property, 
whereas ERISA plans are deals about benefits. 
This difference explains the failure of current ERISA remedies and the make-
whole theory. Trust law routinely redresses breaches involving property but not 
personal harm suffered by beneficiaries. Russell305 followed this model, 
misinterpreting section 409(a) as reaching only asset administration. The make-
whole theory purports to expand ERISA remedies, but relies on trust remedies for 
investment losses to do so. Because ERISA already redresses investment losses in 
section 409(a), the make-whole theory adds nothing to ERISA remedies. 
While trust law should guide the growth of ERISA jurisprudence, it will often 
fail at answering specific questions.306 Fortunately, the statute itself answers the 
most challenging question of ERISA: section 409(a) imposes damages on 
breaching fiduciaries that harm employees personally. Rather than expanding 
remedies, the trust model of ERISA led to Russell and marked a path of limited 
remedies for breaches not involving plan assets. Reading the statute and 
 
302. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 6, at 167–74 (proposing statutory corrections to ERISA 
remedies).  
303.  ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
304.  Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Medill, 
supra, note 11, at 836–37 (anticipating that backpay and front pay may no longer be available as 
equitable remedy); Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (1995) (discussing backpay under ERISA remedies generally).  
305. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1984).  
306. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1646–48 (2010) (noting trust law provides 
conflicting answers to whether courts should give deference to plan administrator). 
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overturning Russell are ways by which the Court could, and should, get ERISA 
remedies back on the right path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
